The EU budget as an opportunity in the crisis: the EU Commission proposal for a new financial framework and a reconstruction fund by Becker, Peter
www.ssoar.info
The EU budget as an opportunity in the crisis:
the EU Commission proposal for a new financial
framework and a reconstruction fund
Becker, Peter
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Stellungnahme / comment
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Becker, P. (2020). The EU budget as an opportunity in the crisis: the EU Commission proposal for a new financial
framework and a reconstruction fund. (SWP Comment, 37/2020). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP-
Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://doi.org/10.18449/2020C37
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-69348-1
 
 
 
NO. 37 JULY 2020 Introduction 
The EU Budget As an Opportunity 
in the Crisis 
The EU Commission Proposal for a New Financial Framework and a 
Reconstruction Fund 
Peter Becker 
In response to the socio-economic consequences of the corona pandemic, the Euro-
pean Commission presented a comprehensive package of measures on 27 May 2020. It 
consists of two components. Firstly, the Commission’s original proposal of May 2018 
for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021–2027 is to be increased to €1.8 
trillion. Secondly, the Commission is proposing a temporary economic budget of €750 
billion under the title “Next Generation EU”. 
This far-reaching package, which the Commission drew up in just a few weeks, can 
have the effect of fundamentally reshaping European budgetary policy and redistrib-
uting competences and responsibilities between the EU and the member states. The 
result could be a significant deepening of European integration. 
 
In May 2020 the Commission adapted and 
updated its original proposal for the next 
MFF 2021–2027 of May 2018 (see Table 1, 
p. 7). In many respects, it is thus breaking 
new ground: 
(1) In addition to the revised MFF, the 
Commission is proposing an additional 
temporary auxiliary budget to boost the EU 
economy. This so-called Next Generation 
EU recovery plan is to amount up to €750 
billion and will run until 31 December 
2024. The extra money is to be channelled 
through the next financial framework and 
its programmes, meaning that the budget 
estimates in the actual MFF will increase 
dramatically. In the centre of this recovery 
plan stands the reconstruction and resili-
ence facility and the increase in the Euro-
pean Structural Funds with the new REACT-
EU programme. 
(2) The Commission is proposing that 
the EU should take on debt of its own to 
finance the European Economic Recovery 
Plan. Although this is not a completely new 
measure, the volume of EU bonds to be 
issued by the Commission and their 30-year 
maturity are unprecedented. 
(3) The increase in the ceiling of own 
resources of the EU budget needed for the 
issuance of these EU bonds is also to be lim-
ited to 30 years and to the financing of the 
recovery package. However, both the dura-
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tion and the extent of the increase to 2 per 
cent of the EU’s gross national income (GNI) 
are highly unusual. 
(4) The overall package also includes pro-
posals for new EU programmes that will 
allow for a gradual change in the distribu-
tion of competences between the EU and 
the member states, as laid down in the Lis-
bon Treaty. This applies, for example, to 
economic policy, aid for ailing businesses, 
and health policy. 
With this proposal, the Commission is tak-
ing a great political risk. Until now, the 
function of the MFF has been to set and 
secure the financing of the EU budget and 
expenditure programmes for seven years. 
This stability of the budget guaranteed plan-
ning and predictability over the medium 
term for EU institutions and the member 
states. Consequently, the MFF is primarily a 
programme and investment budget for the 
medium term. Now, however, the Commis-
sion wants to use it as a stimulus for the 
economy and supplement it with additional 
temporary instruments. This would con-
siderably extend its purpose. 
The Commission was aware that it had 
only one single and decisive attempt to 
broadly anticipate the consensus of the Euro-
pean Council and the subsequent approval 
of the European Parliament. If the new MFF 
is to enter into force on 1 January 2021 as 
planned (and as absolutely necessary), and 
if the legal bases for the various European 
spending programmes are also to be adopted, 
the negotiations must now be concluded 
without major delays. 
The Commission logically assumes that 
a political agreement will be reached in the 
European Council of Heads of State and 
Government by July 2020 at the latest, and 
that the Council and Parliament will then 
conclude the legislative negotiations by 
autumn. There is no time for fundamental 
and comprehensive negotiations by the 
member states on this new package and its 
medium- to long-term consequences. Only 
small adjustments can be expected at the 
decisive summit of Heads of State and Gov-
ernment. 
The Commission is using two negotiating 
instruments: 
(1) There is immense pressure on the 
member states and EU institutions to reach 
agreement in time. On the one hand, this 
is due to the increasingly obvious socio-eco-
nomic consequences of the pandemic, i.e. 
increasing slumps in growth, and conse-
quently drastically increased unemploy-
ment figures. On the other hand, the great 
time pressure no longer allows the member 
states to delay or even postpone negotia-
tions. 
(2) The Commission has clearly tried to 
take account of the conflicting national 
interests of the member states with its 
package, and thus largely sketched out a 
compromise solution. However, as the 
member states will also need successes in 
their national negotiations, the Commis-
sion has included some optional items in 
its package. They can be used for such sym-
bolic successes without jeopardising the 
substance of the overall package. These 
undoubtedly include the enormous volume 
of the economic stimulus budget Next Gen-
eration EU, the partly significant increase 
of some programmes in the actual MFF com-
pared to the intermediate stage of negotia-
tions in the European Council of February 
2020, and also the extent and duration of 
the increase in the ceiling of own resources. 
All EU institutions and member states are 
therefore expected to show a high degree 
of willingness to agree and compromise in 
order to meet the tight timetable. 
The Starting Positions for the 
Negotiations 
However, there is no guarantee that 
the member states will reach agreement 
quickly or that the European Parliament 
will approve the plan in a smooth and 
timely manner. In order to minimise the 
risk of failure and to allow for a compro-
mise solution without delay, the Commis-
sion had previously discussed its proposal 
with key stakeholders. The position papers 
presented by some member states in ad-
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vance gave the Commission additional indi-
cations of national interests, and thus of a 
possible path for agreement. In its position 
paper of 19 April 2020 for the Eurogroup 
negotiations on the first corona aid pack-
age, the Spanish government already stated 
that the Mediterranean countries had a 
strong interest in European aid being pro-
vided in the form of grants rather than 
loans. 
The Polish position paper of 8 May, on 
the other hand, provided indications that 
the central and eastern European member 
states are interested in substantial additional 
funds as part of a European economic 
stimulus package. As the main beneficiaries 
of cohesion policy, they are in favour of 
increasing the budget for the European 
Structural Funds. In their view, the existing 
socio-economic criteria should continue 
to be applied for the distribution of these 
additional funds. This would mean that the 
underdeveloped central and eastern Euro-
pean regions would automatically benefit 
more than others from the additional funds 
in the economic stimulus package. 
In its non-paper of 8 May, the French 
Ministry of Finance outlined the country’s 
ideas and objectives for a European recon-
struction fund. Paris stressed that the 
member states hardest hit by the pandemic 
should receive the biggest share of sub-
sidies. For a limited period of three years, 
the EU budget should be increased with 
additional funds of between €150 and €300 
billion per year in order to give all Euro-
pean economies a tangible economic boost. 
This could be financed by collectively 
taking on debt, which would be repaid over 
a period of 40 years. The money should be 
used for existing European spending pro-
grammes with European added value, such 
as European research or investment sup-
port. The distribution of additional funding 
should be based not only on the usual 
socio-economic criteria, but also on the 
death tolls as well as the burdens on health 
systems as a result of the pandemic. 
The Franco-German agreement was un-
doubtedly of particular importance and 
presented on 18 May during a joint video 
press conference by Chancellor Angela 
Merkel and French President Emmanuel 
Macron. The Franco-German tandem 
pleaded in favour of an ambitious – but 
limited in time and scope – fund for the 
economic recovery of European economies 
within the framework of the MFF. In total, 
an additional €500 billion is to be made 
available for the European Green Deal and 
digitisation. This bilateral initiative also 
advocated that the EU should take on debt 
and raise the ceiling of own resources for 
this purpose. Debt raising should remain 
a temporary exception and be linked to a 
binding repayment schedule in the Euro-
pean decision on own resources. Although 
the Franco-German paper was on many 
points much more vague than the pro-
posals put forward by the French Ministry 
of Finance, this initiative – together with 
the package of proposals presented one 
week later by the Commission – has domi-
nated the debate ever since. The other 
member states had to find their own posi-
tions on this Franco-German accord. The 
initiative also strengthened the European 
Commission’s backing for its proposal. 
The so-called Frugal Four – the Nether-
lands, Austria, Sweden, and Denmark, which 
have been advocating for an EU budget of 
1 per cent of EU GNI for two years – had to 
react quickly to the Franco-German initia-
tive. They therefore presented their own 
position paper as early as 23 May. With it, 
they also advocated for a temporary emer-
gency fund to boost the European econo-
mies and strengthen the national health 
systems. Under no circumstances, however, 
should the fund be financed through Com-
munity borrowing. The money in the fund 
should only be used after a careful needs 
assessment and with strict commitments to 
implement structural reforms. At the same 
time, the Frugal Four maintained their 
basic positions for the upcoming MFF nego-
tiations: They insist on an ambitious mod-
ernisation of European spending policies, 
on the conditionality of the rule of law, 
and on rebates for their contributions. 
Prior to this, the European Parliament 
had also defined its negotiating position in 
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several resolutions. Members of European 
Parliament also largely maintained their 
earlier demands for the MFF negotiations: 
They called for new European sources for 
own resources, for existing expenditure 
programmes to be significantly better 
equipped, and for a mandatory mid-term 
review of the MFF. As a contingency plan, 
they called for the expenditure programmes 
to be automatically extended in the event 
that agreement on the new MFF 2021–
2027 cannot be reached in time. In addi-
tion, the European Parliament called for a 
permanent increase in the ceiling of own 
resources and for the issuance of EU bonds 
to finance the MFF. In this way, the Parlia-
ment wants to allow for additional invest-
ment in the European Green Deal, the 
digitisation of the internal market, and 
strategic investments. 
Search for the Path to 
Compromise 
Even before it finally presented its package 
on 27 May, the Commission thus had an 
insight into the positions of key players, 
and thus the most important cornerstones 
for a path to compromise. Its proposal takes 
up decisive elements of these positions. 
For example, Italy and Spain – the mem-
ber states most severely affected by the pan-
demic – are to receive the largest shares 
from the recovery plan. In addition, the 
share of non-repayable grants clearly out-
weighs that of loans. This is in line with 
the expectations of the highly indebted 
southern European member states and the 
demand of the European Parliament. In 
favour of the central and eastern European 
states, the package contains a significant 
increase in the Cohesion Funds, which will 
already take effect in the last months of 
2020 and apply for the next four years. 
According to expectations of the western 
Europeans, the Commission proposes to 
direct additional funds and the growth 
stimulus towards modernisation policies 
and the climate policy objectives of the 
European Green Deal as well as the digi-
tisation of the internal market. The alloca-
tion of funds from the reconstruction and 
resilience facility for economic recovery 
shall be linked to the implementation of 
national reform programmes. All member 
states are to draw up such programmes by 
30 April 2021 at the latest and submit them 
to the Commission for approval. These so-
called National Recovery and Resilience 
Plans are intended to compile those reforms 
and investments that strengthen the growth 
potential and the economic and social 
resilience of the respective member states, 
and thus promote a sustainable economic 
recovery. To this end, measures for eco-
logical and digital change in particular are 
to be listed. In the framework of the Euro-
pean Semester, the Commission is consider-
ing agreeing with the member states’ con-
crete milestones and targets as well as a 
timetable for implementing the reforms 
and investments. Money will only be paid 
out if the member states have actually 
achieved these interim targets. 
The European Economic Recovery Plan 
and the support policies are thus closely 
linked with the European Semester for 
economic policy coordination, the imple-
mentation of long-term structural reforms 
in the member states, and the continuous 
monitoring of the use of European funds 
in these countries. All this is in line with 
the demands of the net contributors from 
northern Europe. 
Finally, with its supranational approach, 
the Commission is responding to the Euro-
pean Parliament’s requests of integrating 
the recovery plan into existing Community 
instruments, such as the MFF and the Euro-
pean Structural Funds. In this way, the Par-
liament’s rights of budgetary control are 
respected. The creation of a new health 
programme is also in line with the Euro-
pean Parliament’s wishes and the Franco-
German ideas. 
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The Continuation of the 
Budget Negotiations 
Nevertheless, the MFF negotiations are not 
starting from scratch, but are following on 
from the unsuccessful negotiations that 
came to a temporary halt at an extraordi-
nary European Council summit on 20–21 
February 2020. The President of the Coun-
cil, Charles Michel, now has three options 
for continuing the negotiations in the Euro-
pean Council: 
(1) He could support the Commission’s 
proposal and present it to the Heads of 
State and Government as the starting point 
for negotiations. Reductions or realloca-
tions in some policies already agreed by the 
member states in their negotiations would 
have to be brought forward again and jus-
tified. This would make it more difficult for 
the Frugal Four to insist on a limited MFF 
and rebates for themselves. 
(2) Alternatively, President Michel could 
take up the interim status of the negotia-
tions at the special European Council 
summit of 20 February 2020 and add the 
Commission’s proposal for an economic 
stimulus auxiliary budget. In their joint 
position paper, Berlin and Paris had already 
advocated for this by using the interim 
status of the February negotiations as a 
starting point. This would put the Commis-
sion’s proposal for a temporary economic 
stimulus budget at the forefront of the nego-
tiations. Any deviation from interim results 
that had already been agreed upon – as 
they had been fixed in the 14 February pro-
posal of the President of the European 
Council – would have to be justified. The 
Commission’s approach to also adapt the 
actual MFF to the challenges of the crisis 
could be examined in detail by the member 
states and would have to be justified in 
more detail by the Commission. 
(3) The most likely option would be for 
President Michel to present a completely 
new proposal for the critical negotiations 
on the next MFF 2021–2027 in the Euro-
pean Council. Based on the state of play of 
the negotiations in February, Michel could 
use both the European Commission’s new 
proposal and the positions of the member 
states to put together his own updated com-
promise proposal. Such an overall pack-
age – increased by the economic stimulus 
budget – could facilitate an agreement, 
as it would provide the Heads of State and 
Government with many new elements for 
the traditional European package deals and 
exchanges. The agreement to closely link 
payments from the European Structural 
Funds to the European Semester and to 
focus on the goals of the European Green 
Deal could thus be compensated for with 
higher payments from the temporary Next 
Generation EU economic stimulus budget. 
To this end, the new Just Transition Fund 
(JTF) could be used to cushion the costs in 
regions and sectors particularly affected by 
the phase-out of fossil fuels. The controver-
sial distribution of grants and loans from 
the economic stimulus package between 
northern and southern European states 
could be balanced by changing the criteria 
for allocating the money. 
However, this approach also involves 
risks: 
∎ The total volume of the two elements – 
the MFF and the recovery stimulus pack-
age – is limited. Not all distributional 
conflicts can be resolved with additional 
funds. Moreover, the combining of the 
two money pots in the negotiations is 
likely to feed the expectations of poten-
tial recipients that they will receive addi-
tional financial compensation. 
∎ Package deals between the two elements 
of the negotiation package has one major 
disadvantage: The downside of linking 
the two elements is that it would give 
rise to extensive veto possibilities for in-
dividual member states. If everything is 
connected with everything and must 
be agreed unanimously in the package, 
everything can also fail due to one minor 
point of the deal. 
∎ The proposed criteria for distributing the 
funds from the stimulus budget among 
the member states appear to be open to 
criticism, as the Commission has clearly 
been pursuing an attempt to appease 
potential veto players with this instru-
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ment. However, the criteria cannot nec-
essarily be derived from the extent to 
which the member states are affected by 
the pandemic. For example, Belgium, 
whose infection and death rates are very 
high, would receive considerably less 
money than states with very low num-
bers. The criteria are therefore likely to 
be called into question during the nego-
tiations. If the Commission cannot pro-
vide a convincing justification, this con-
flict could mark the beginning of the 
failure of the overall compromise. 
∎ In order to avoid this, the European 
Council President must be able to have 
recourse to a traditional instrument of 
European budget negotiations, namely 
the ability to offer individual member 
states special payments or exemptions. 
To do this, he must have a certain degree 
of financial leeway that can allow for 
this solution. Since it is obvious that some 
member states want to make use of this 
possibility of special arrangements or 
payments, this option could further in-
crease the overall volume of the package. 
∎ The total foreseeable volume of the two 
elements, amounting to almost €1.85 
trillion, can only be financed through 
(a) significantly higher national contribu-
tions from the member states, for which 
there is no indication whatsoever, (b) new 
sources for own resources that will not 
generate sufficient resources in the short 
term, and (c) the raising of debt, for 
which the Commission has made a pro-
posal. However, the legal basis for loan 
financing on this scale seems highly 
questionable. Complaints can be ex-
pected, at least before the Federal Con-
stitutional Court in Karlsruhe. 
∎ The necessary adaptation of the Euro-
pean decision on own resources requires 
the rapid approval of all national parlia-
ments. This seems extremely ambitious 
if the economic stimulus package is 
to be implemented as early as January 
2021. This is why the French Ministry 
of Finance, in its non-paper of 8 May, 
proposed a political commitment and 
obligation of all Heads of State and Gov-
ernment to implement a new decision on 
own resources in advance. However, this 
idea is probably not very realistic, given 
the rulings of the German Federal Con-
stitutional Court on European political 
rights and the obligation to make the 
Bundestag responsible. In this respect, 
possible borrowing by the EU remains 
subject to considerable uncertainties. 
∎ The further course of the Brexit nego-
tiations and a possible extension of the 
transition phase present additional 
disruption potential. 
The Long-term Effects 
As in previous EU budget negotiations, the 
European Commission has linked its pro-
posal for a new MFF 2021–2027 to a major 
reform project – the transition of European 
economies to climate-neutral, sustainable, 
and digital growth models. In this respect, 
the Commission is using the Covid-19 crisis 
to implement these objectives more effec-
tively and in a more targeted manner with 
the new EU budget. 
The original proposal of May 2018 had 
been formulated by the previous Commis-
sion under President Jean-Claude Juncker, 
but it hardly took these new political prior-
ities into account. For example, the Euro-
pean Green Deal, the JTF, the promotion of 
digitisation, and the project for a European 
defence policy had not yet been budgeted 
for, or not adequately. The Commission 
has now taken advantage of the European 
Council’s invitation of 23 April 2020 to 
draw up a comprehensive recovery fund. In 
addition, there was a great necessity and 
high expectations in some member states 
that a demonstration of European solidarity 
was now needed – in the form of a massive 
economic stimulus package from the Euro-
pean budget. The new Commission took 
all of this on board in order to underpin its 
political priorities with appropriate budg-
etary proposals. 
The proposal is expected to have long-
term implications for the European integra-
tion process. The European solidarity that 
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was loudly called for at the beginning of 
the pandemic is now becoming clearly 
visible. The EU is prepared to spend huge 
sums of money to support the member 
states most affected. At the same time, it is 
determined to break up existing structures 
and procedures of the MFF negotiations, 
and thus to change itself. In addition, the 
scope for European action in health policy 
will expand considerably. With the pro-
posed new programme, the EU would be 
able to act more quickly and with greater 
solidarity in this policy, too. 
The use of the Community budget and 
cohesion policy instruments undoubtedly 
strengthens the economic policy options of 
the Community institutions, first and fore-
most the European Commission. At the 
same time, the control and participation 
rights of the European Parliament are 
respected. The proposal to take out debt 
jointly via the EU budget also strengthens 
the sentiment of solidarity in the EU. Dur-
ing the financial and debt crisis 10 years 
ago, the EU still chose the intergovernmen-
tal approach beyond the European treaties 
in order to establish new institutions such 
as the European Stability Mechanism and to 
be able to implement additional financing 
and rescue programmes. 
Certainly, negotiations in the European 
Council and with the European Parliament 
will not simply lead to the adoption of the 
European Commission’s proposal. But if the 
member states follow the basic approach 
and direction of the proposal, this package 
will mark a turning point in the process of 
European integration. It would be as drastic 
as the agreement on the European Single 
Market or European Monetary Union. 
However, if the integration process is 
indeed deepened and broadened to such an 
extent, this also means that all actors bear 
much greater responsibility for the success 
of the EU. For all EU-27 member states and 
EU institutions, this increase in common 
policies also requires a greater willingness 
to compromise, mutual consideration, and 
an understanding of each other’s national 
sensitivities, problems, and concerns. This 
applies both to the potential recipients of 
European solidarity and to those who pro-
vide the necessary financial resources. 
Dr Peter Becker is a Senior Associate in the EU / Europe Division at SWP. 
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